The 17 th Amendment disturbed the existing electoral system in the United States by requiring direct elections for state Senators. Scholars have argued this made the Senate more populist and contributed to the growth of government in the US post-1913. We employ econometric tools to investigate whether the mean ideology of the Senate and its winning policies experienced a structural change around the time of the enactment. We find no compelling evidence of a structural break at that time but do find some evidence for a change in the mid-to-late 1890s.
Introduction
The 17 th Amendment to the US Constitution established that Senators were to be directly elected by popular vote rather than appointed by state legislatures. The amendment ended a generation of state-by-state battles attempting to bring Senate elections under popular control. Although its 1913 passage is regarded by historians as enhancing democratic accountability, Zywicki (1994) argues that the amendment helped erode federalism and the separation of power. As Senator fidelity moved towards the electorate and away from protecting states' interests, the Senate became as populist as the House, thus paving the way for government growth. In making this argument, Zywicki is attempting to contribute to one of the biggest questions in public economics: the dramatic increase in government in the United States during the 20 th Century (Higgs, 1987; Husted and Kenny, 1997; Lott and Kenny, 1998; Holcombe, 1999 Congress (1913 Congress ( -1915 . The operational dataset thus contains 67 observations ranging from 1879 to 2013
( Fig. 1 ). We exploit these data to search for structural changes in the series of mean Senator ideology and mean winning policy coordinates.
Methodology
Structural change implies a sudden shift in any or all of the model parameters that control for the series mean and variance. In the current context, a structural break in either series would be indicative of mean "jumps" in the ideology of the chamber (Senate), or winning policy (i.e., the ideology average of enacted bills for that Congress), whereas a break in variance implies a volatility shift not unlike, for instance, the Great Moderation. If the 17 th Amendment instigated higher growth of federal government, one should observe a structural break in ideology in the 63 rd Congress, presumably to the ideological left. While a visual inspection offers little in terms of inference, the diagnostics indicate that the mean chamber ideology is lower (-0.056 versus +0.01), and SD is approximately two times larger pre-Amendment. For mean winning outcomes, the average is higher pre-Amendment (0.037 versus -0.07), and the sample SD is exactly halved afterwards.
We let both series evolve according to an AR(1) data generating process with drift and a deterministic linear trend:
are serially uncorrelated errors and lag number is determined by Akaike and Schwarz Bayesian Info criteria. The structural change in series mean comes from breaks in drift , trend  and autoregressive  parameters, while series' volatility is largely dependent on error variance 2   if  is small. We estimate equation (1) using OLS. We use the Quandt-Andrews (Quandt, 1960; Andrews, 1993) now-conventional approach to testing for structural break, which rests on the "sup" methodology, in which the maximal significant F-(supF) or Waldstatistic (supW) across all observations is the most likely breakdate.
We use the supW-statistic, which has the advantage over supF in that it allows for residual heteroskedasticity. All statistically significant supW-statistics represent possible breakdates, but only that which minimizes the model sum of squared errors (SSE) is the most probable candidate (Hansen, 2001) . In testing for and dating structural breaks in the series' variances, the same methodology follows for equation (2):
Finally, the existence of breakpoints could erroneously lead to the conclusion that the series is nonstationary. We then use the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) (1992) test to distinguish between structural break and random walk disturbances. Conventional unit root tests tend to under-reject the null of nonstationarity in the presence of a break, while the ZA procedure allows for existence of one endogenously determined structural break in trend or intercept in testing unit root. Since neither series seem to be trending, we allow for an intercept break only, within 10% trimmed data.
Some caveats are in order. First, the power of structural break tests is lower in smaller samples. Although a test statistic modification is possible, it is computationally costly (Antoshin et al., 2008) . Second, the Quandt-Andrews procedure assumes regressor stationarity. As a solution for nonstationary regressors, Hansen (2000) proposes a "fixed regressor bootstrap." Third, small sample size makes it impractical to search for multiple breaks simultaneously, even though an event such as women's suffrage would make for a plausible structural break from public choice theory standpoint. Lastly, we recognize that structural break test results may be sensitive to model specification. Table 1 summarizes our findings. In the case of mean Senate ideology, none of the supWstatistics, in any form (level, average and exponential) , are significant at usual levels within 5, 10 and 15% trimmed data, so we find no evidence of a structural break. We also find no significant variance shifts. The ZA test rejects nonstationarity in favor of an intercept break in the 54 th Congress (1895 Congress ( -1897 . Although this date comes closest to the breakdate in the Quandt-Andrews procedure, it remains statistically insignificant at 10% significance level.
Results
For the mean of winning policy ideology, the maximal significant supW-statistic also falls in the 54 th Congress. Plotting the SSE from equation (1) over time, we observe the global minimum to fall in the 64 th Congress (1915 Congress ( -1917 . The ZA test allowing for an intercept break rejects nonstationarity at the 3% level, and also gives the breakdate as in the 54 th Congress.
Turning to variance shifts of mean winning ideology and repeating the same procedures on equation (2), we reject the null of no breakpoint at 4% level within 5, 10 and 15% trimmed data, with the maximal statistic during the 54 th Congress. The SSE for variance breakdate (from equation (2)) exhibits multiple sharp drops indicative of a breakdate, with a global minimum in the 97 th Congress (1981 Congress ( -1983 . However, the evidence overall suggests that the most probable breakpoint for mean and variance of winning policy ideology and chamber mean ideology occurred between 1895 and 1897, during the 54 th Congress.
Conclusion
In his analysis of the political economy origins of the 17 th Amendment, Zywicki (1994) notes that it was in the 1880s where dissatisfaction with the indirect system began to escalate. During this period, many states began to employ extra-constitutional means to move towards popular election of Senators (Riker, 1955) . These approaches -public canvass and pledged state legislators -allowed for direct public participations in Senate elections. Our results provide some evidence that these approaches or other contemporary changes led to a change in ideology of the mean Senator, not the passage of the 17 th Amendment. This finding suggests that while much the growth of in government occurred during the 20 th century, the underlying ideological and institutional changes likely began in the Civil War and its aftermath (Higgs, 1987; Holcombe, 1999) . .3 1 8 8 0 1 8 9 0 1 9 0 0 1 9 1 0 1 9 2 0 1 9 3 0 1 9 4 0 1 9 5 0 1 9 6 0 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 
